The initiation of activities by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the EPPO) will add a novel layer to the investigation and prosecution of crimes against the European Union’s financial interests, as defined by Directive 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests. Formally an EU body, the EPPO will, through its European Delegated Prosecutors, interact with and be inserted into national criminal justice systems.
This dissertation will study the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the EPPO. The understanding of prosecutorial discretion requires examining the EPPO’s internal functioning to observe the degree of discretionality across levels of prosecutors, and the drivers and limits capable of shaping the exercise of such discretion. In addition, this dissertation will suggest accountability and review mechanisms applicable to discretionary decisions that respect the independence of the EPPO, while avoiding arbitrary decisions and allowing for efficient and flexible results in the performance of the EPPO’s functions.